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The proposed Electricity (Amendment) Bill, 2020 aims to 
reduce subsidies and push for privatisation, especially in 
the distribution segment of the power sector. 
Undertaking structural changes in a core sector at a time 
of crisis from the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic 
effects defies logic. The proposed amendments are not 
only anti-people, but they also fail to address the 
long-term crises in the sector and will only accelerate its 
deterioration. The central government must hold off on 
passing any hasty legislation on the subject and adopt a 
more scientific and less ideological approach to deal 
with the travails of the power sector.
The Electricity (Amendment) Bill, 2020
1 is a rehashed 
version of a bill that the central government has been 
trying to pass in Parliament since 2014. Different versions 
of this bill have been circulated since 2014, the latest coming at 
a time when India is trying to fi ght the COVID-19 pandemic and 
fi gure out a way to deal with the economic fallout of the pro-
longed nationwide lockdown. The overall aim of the proposed 
bill is to reduce subsidies in the power sector and push for pri-
vatisation, especially in the distribution segment of the power 
sector. This move comes at a time of severe economic slow-
down, when salvaging productive capacity, jobs, wages, and 
demand and supply in the economy should be the priority. 
Undertaking structural changes, which are likely to further 
change the centre–state relationship and increase costs of an 
essential commodity, in a core sector such as electricity at such 
a time defi es logic. 
A Brief Contemporary History of the Power Sector
The Electricity Act of 2003 was passed by the fi rst National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, which consolidated 
the structural reforms that were introduced and implemented 
in the power sector since 1991 (Bhattacharyya 2005). 
In an earlier era, the responsibility to create electricity 
infrastructure and expand access to energy was with the state 
electricity boards, entities which were arms of state govern-
ments. Therefore, the task of ensuring affordability, reliability, 
and growth were those of the state government. The centre 
provided the broad contours of policy and also played a role in 
ensuring access to natural resources which are not equitably 
distributed across states. Since the structural reforms of the 
1990s, almost all state electricity boards were “unbundled” 
into generation, transmission, and distribution companies 
(refe rred as DISCOMs for the sake of simplicity). Power genera-
tion was delicensed to promote private sector investments and 
private companies were also allowed to undertake distribution 
of electricity. 
The generation segment did attract some private investments, 
buoyed by the guaranteed returns and payment security 
afforded by the state-backed model. But the mess of non-
performing assets in the power sector we see today is indicative 
of the fl aws in this model. Privatisation in the power sector has 
stalled and even where it was pushed through, markets have 
failed to deliver (Chandrasekhar 2018), thus, underlining the 
need to rethink our reliance on markets and revert to plan-
ning. We will return to both these arguments shortly as we 
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discuss three aspects of the proposed amendment to the 
Electricity Act, 2003. First, we discuss the attempt to further 
privatise electricity distribution through the introduction of 
sub-licensees and franchisees. Second, we discuss the pro-
posed elimination of cross-subsidies to be replaced by direct 
benefi t transfers. Third, we discuss the envisaged centralisa-
tion of the power sector in contravention of the provisions of 
the Constitution, which have placed the electricity sector in 
the concurrent list.
Why Are DISCOMs Financially Stressed?
One of the main proposals of the new bill is that new “distribution 
sub-licensees” or franchisees may be introduced to manage 
the distribution of electricity in a region within the jurisdic-
tion of a distribution licensee (which in most cases, currently, 
are state-owned DISCOMs). While the distribution franchisee 
model is an older one that has been tried out earlier in differ-
ent regions with varying degrees of success, the proposed sub-
licensee model does not seem to bring anything new except 
perhaps to isolate the more profi table clusters within DISCOMs 
to be handed over to sub-licensees. In other words, it intro-
duces markets in select segments of the distribution business. 
For many years now, the neo-liberal wisdom has been advo-
cating separation of carriage from content by unbundling the 
wires business from the actual supply of electricity. In this 
model, the role of the state DISCOMs is restricted to maintain-
ing the wires and infrastructure while the actual supply of 
electricity is carried out by separate (presumably private) sup-
pliers. This was advocated by the World Bank in their 2014 re-
port and supported uncritically by many independent organi-
sations that work on power policy (Prayas 2018). Opposition 
from several states and the DISCOMs themselves has merely led 
to rephrasing of the proposal, keeping the crux of the amend-
ment unchanged. 
The central government seems to have based their proposal 
for introducing private sub-licensees on two claims—fi rst, that 
this would reduce the cost of power procurement which is cur-
rently high due to poor planning that DISCOMs have always 
been responsible for (Josey et al 2018) and, second, that it 
would reduce the cost of operation (Singh 2006). The fi rst 
claim is based on the assumption that state-owned DISCOMs 
are currently facing severe fi nancial distress because of unsci-
entifi c management of their supply portfolios, resulting in 
high costs of power procurement. This, according to the gov-
ernment, will be resolved by the introduction of distribution 
sub-licensees, which will look for ways to reduce costs, thus 
introducing effi ciency into the system. This claim and there-
fore the solution to deal with the problem is misplaced for the 
three reasons discussed in the following sections.
Miscalculated Demand Projections
Much of the power procurement by DISCOMs currently happens 
through long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs). In the 
case of thermal plants, the DISCOM pays to the generator a 
variable cost on a per-unit (kWh) basis, and a fi xed cost as per 
schedule (either long or short term) duly approved by the 
 regulator. Over the years, there has been a signifi cant increase 
in coal prices by the public sector units controlled by the 
central government who produce more than 94% of the total 
coal in India. In addition, the central government levies a coal 
cess (which is effectively a carbon tax) in the name of clean 
energy. In June 2010, this cess was fi rst levied on all coal 
mined/imported in India at 50 per tonne, but has been dou-
bled three times since then, reaching a rate of 400 per tonne on 
1 March 2016.  India’s Central Electricity Regulatory Commission 
(CERC) has held that the central government’s imposition of 
the cess constitutes a “change of law” in all PPAs entered into 
by central power producers under the Electricity Act (CERC 2018). 
Therefore, all thermal power plants have raised their tariffs to 
pass on the cost of this cess to consumers. Over and above this, 
steep increases in freight charges for transporting coal have 
also resulted in higher variable costs. Between 2009–10 and 
2016–17, the average coal cost (including taxes and duties), 
coal transportation cost, and taxes and duties on transportation 
increased three times, specifi cally by 82%, 60%, and 340% 
respectively. These unprecedented cost increases were mainly 
due to the policies of the central government monoliths (Coal 
India and the Indian Railways) and the Ministry of Finance 
that sees the coal and power sectors as the proverbial golden 
goose. All these cost increases have been passed through to 
the DISCOMs who are left to manage the fi nal consumer tariffs 
 under the constraints imposed by the state government 
(through the regulator). 
While increases in variable costs of thermal generation are 
more or less inevitable, it is the fi xed costs that are putting the 
DISCOMs in distress today, since 92 GW of new thermal capacity 
has been added in the power sector in the last fi ve years (CEA 
2020). The fi xed costs of these new plants are higher compared 
to older thermal plants as the debt that fi nanced these plants is 
yet to be repaid. These new thermal plants have also been 
commissioned at a time when renewable energy (RE) supply to 
the grid has increased despite the supply–demand mismatch 
and the upward revision of national and international targets 
for RE sources. We shall return to the issue of RE later. 
It is important to underline that the new generation capacity 
has come up in an environment of an overall economy-wide 
slowdown in demand even before the COVID-19 pandemic 
 arrived at Indian shores. Power sector growth has been slower 
than anticipated, as per the government’s projections. The 
 revised demand projections in the 19th Electrical Power Survey 
(EPS), published by the Central Electricity Authority (CEA), are 
signifi cantly lower than the earlier projections from the 18th 
EPS (CEA 2019, 2020). Mostly, power generators (independent 
power producers or IPPs), who had banked their revenue 
streams on power markets instead of long-term PPAs, are the 
ones facing diffi culties in paying back their debts. For the 
DISCOMs, the lack of growth in demand as anticipated has led 
to a problem of having to pay fi xed charges for power plants 
(the ones they have signed PPAs with) even though they are 
purchasing very little power from some of them. To lay the 
blame for this squarely on the DISCOMs is unfair since this is 
prompted by faulty demand projections by the CEA coupled 
SPECIAL ARTICLE
october 10, 2020 vol lV no 41 EPW  Economic & Political Weekly42
with the misplaced hubris of windfall profi ts anticipated by 
IPPs without PPAs for sale of their power in day-ahead markets. 
Yet, the blame for the poor performance is placed at the door 
of the DISCOMs who will now be penalised further with the 
proposed amendments.   
If the DISCOMs are responsible for not being able to forecast 
power demand accurately, so is the central government for 
projecting an ambitious 7% GDP growth, the CEA for overesti-
mating demand, the IPPs who banked on power markets, and 
the centrally-controlled power fi nance institutions and public 
sector banks who gave loans without the guarantees of PPAs. 
State-owned DISCOMs are simply easier scapegoats but hardly 
the main culprits.
Expensive ‘Must-run’ Renewable Energy
The miscalculated demand growth forecast is however only 
one of the problems. The other reason is that there has been a 
signifi cant increase in the fl ow of RE into the grid, especially 
solar energy, in the last few years. This increase is based on 
chasing centrally determined targets for RE and not on a 
scientifi c study of whether that much energy is required, 
given newly commissioned and planned thermal capacity. 
While RE technologies were new and more expensive some 
years back and special incentives were needed to absorb them 
into the grid at that time, these incentives remain in place 
although costs for new plants have reduced signifi cantly. For 
example, solar and wind energy plants enjoy a “must-run” 
status as per the central government’s Grid Code, which is 
mandatory for all states, that is, all energy produced by solar 
and wind energy plants must be absorbed by the DISCOMs, 
irrespective of its cost.
Thus, it is the central government’s must-run directive to 
the states through the CERC, mandating a higher share for 
solar and wind power into their respective grids that have 
led to higher power procurement costs for the DISCOMs. The 
DISCOMs in South India have been particularly affected by 
this since they were at the forefront of inviting and incentivis-
ing private capital in high-priced RE because of their natural 
resource  advantage. For example, in Tamil Nadu, about 
15%–30% of the total energy is being supplied by wind and 
solar energy plants depending on the month. While wind 
 energy is cheaper, the average cost of solar power in Tamil 
Nadu is more than 6/kWh, about 50% higher than the average 
cost of thermal power in the state. While newer solar plants 
are relatively cheaper, the DISCOMs are still bound by high-cost 
PPAs signed with RE developers before 2016.2 This has meant 
lower and slower cost recovery for the producers on the one 
hand (at least in cases where long-term PPAs do not exist) and 
higher power procurement costs for DISCOMs, even when low-
er-cost power is available.
Again, it was the CEA’s infl ated demand projections that led 
the DISCOMs to enter into long-term PPAs with both thermal 
and renewable generators. The combined impact of high power 
purchase costs under the old RE contracts and fi xed cost 
compensation to thermal generators (with PPAs) in the face of 
low demand growth is solely attributable to the policies of 
the two central agencies for which the DISCOMs are now being 
held  accountable. 
The high cost of power procurement will continue in the 
 future unless there is a change in the status afforded to 
RE plants or a reduction in variable costs of existing plants, 
which would require a reduction in the cost of coal. Neither is 
likely in the immediate future with or without the Electricity 
(Amendment) Bill of 2020. It is not clear how the situation will 
be different for these new distribution sub-licensees unless 
they are given special concessions, not awarded to the 
DISCOMs. For example, it is possible that a distribution sub-
licensee, free of any obligation of older contracts that the 
DISCOM is bound by, purchases newer low-cost solar power 
leaving the DISCOMs with high-priced RE from older renewa-
ble plants as well as fi xed costs of thermal plants with whom 
it has signed PPAs. 
Cost of Operation
The second claim for promoting private sub-licensees in elec-
tricity distribution is to reduce the cost of operation, that is, 
reduce the aggregate technical and commercial losses. For this 
to be possible, two things are needed. First, an improvement in 
billing and collection effi ciency and second, an investment in 
distribution infrastructure such as transformers, and low-
voltage distribution lines. 
In November 2015, the central government introduced the 
Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana (UDAY) mainly to enable the 
DISCOMs to reduce their aggregate technical and commercial 
(AT&C) losses as well as reduce the gap between the average 
cost of supply (ACS) and the average revenue realised (ARR). 
According to the MOP (2020), the overall AT&C loss and ACS–
ARR gap for 26 UDAY states and seven union territories for fi -
nancial year (FY) 2016–17 were 23.96% and 48 paise per unit, 
respectively which has reduced to 18.19% and 27 paise per 
unit, respectively in FY 2019–20. The remarkable improve-
ment of 29% in the AT&C losses and 44% reduction in ACS–ARR 
gap in just three years (FY 2016–17 to FY 2019–20) indicates 
how most DISCOMs in India have improved their operational 
performance while 16 state governments have also taken over 
75% of the outstanding debt of the DISCOMs as on 30 Septem-
ber 2015 (MOP 2019). There is no doubt that these 16 states, 
which have cumulatively taken on a debt of more than 2.08 
lakh crore, have indeed supported these DISCOMs to reduce 
their interest costs and improve their credit ratings. There-
fore, the claim that only privatisation will succeed in such a 
vital sector is patently false to begin with. 
The privatisation of the DISCOMs and the introduction of new 
private electricity distributors in the form of franchisees have 
been tried in the past and have largely been unsuccessful. 
DISCOMs were not only separated from the erstwhile state 
electricity boards and made into companies, but in many 
states they were also segregated regionally to make them 
operationally smaller and more manageable to facilitate priva-
tisation. However, private distributors were only interested in 
urban clusters with bulk consumers. And even in these, while 
improvements in billing effi ciency were seen in some areas, 
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franchisees were unable and/or unwilling to invest large 
amounts of money on infrastructure as the profi t margins 
would inevitably be too narrow.
Privatisation, Distribution Franchisees and Their Pitfalls
Other than Odisha, Delhi, and Mumbai, no other state’s utility 
could be privatised. In Andhra Pradesh, attempts of the then 
incumbent political party (the Telugu Desam Party) to privatise 
the sector since 1996 were met with widespread protests even-
tually costing the party the subsequent elections (Suri 2013). 
Mumbai is an island city, with no agricultural consumption, 
making it much easier to manage, but the experience of priva-
tised electricity distribution there has also been problematic 
with frequent protests against continuous increases in tariffs 
(Nair 2018; PTI 2009). In Odisha, after years of failed  attempts 
to manage the sector, and three failed attempts at private 
management, electricity distribution has reverted to the state 
(Mahalingam 2002; Dubash et al 2018). The experience in 
Odisha has demonstrated that this experiment in a  region 
with a diverse set of consumers, largely rural, and a smaller 
industrial consumer base, has been a dismal failure. In Delhi, 
privatisation had to be propped up with generous handouts 
from the taxpayer, far in excess of what was initially proposed. 
And despite this, and the advantage of a non-agrarian consumer 
base, privatisation only partially succeeded in redu cing power 
procurement costs but failed in transferring those benefi ts to 
consumers (Dubash and Rao 2006; Singh 2005). 
When privatisation did not work, the model of distribution 
franchisees was introduced, where the state-run utilities 
would subcontract a section of the network to private compa-
nies or other agencies, much like what is proposed now. These 
subcontractors were expected to improve the losses and collec-
tion of bill payments in these regions, something the distribu-
tion utilities had been unable to do. However, after it was fi rst 
introduced many years back, this model could be employed 
only in a few regions where agriculture consumption was low, 
for example, in Bhiwandi, Agra and Ahmedabad. Even in these 
regions, this model has had a sketchy experience (Thakur et al 
2017; Chitnis et al 2009). The experience of distribution fran-
chisees shows that while some billing and collection effi cien-
cies could be addressed by the franchisees, reducing technical 
losses would require signifi cant capital expenditure which, 
without the ability to pass on to consumers, the franchisee will 
have no incentive to undertake. The grand plans of encourag-
ing rural franchisees came to a swift and quiet end some 
years back as private companies did not see profi t in supply-
ing electricity to a largely poor population unable to pay the 
full cost of electricity. 
Therefore, even after cherry-picking only urban agglomera-
tions for franchising electricity supply, this model could not 
work. The character of electricity consumption in India itself 
is such that many consumers still cannot pay the full cost of 
electricity and for small- and medium-scale manufacturing 
units, especially in the informal sector, electricity constitutes 
a signifi cant proportion of input costs. Large consumers have 
exited the grid because of the open access policies introduced 
by the central government in the Electricity Act, 2003, making 
their own arrangements for cheaper electricity supply. There-
fore, distribution companies do not even have the benefi t of 
consumers who can pay the full cost and more for electricity, 
such that the electricity supply business can be fi nancially via-
ble, if not profi table. In such a situation, undertaking capital 
expenditure to improve line losses also becomes an expensive 
proposition with no guarantee of equivalent returns. 
The claim of privatisation improving effi ciency and reducing 
costs is dependent on the assumption that there will be compe-
tition among different distributors who will then have an 
incentive to reduce costs. For a business with a wires  monopoly, 
this is a diffi cult proposition to begin with (Ranganathan 
2005). The bid to introduce private sub-licensees in the form of 
franchisees at an earlier time has also been a failure in most 
cases, with either an inability to reduce costs, or an inability to 
transfer the cost reduction benefi ts to consumers. With the 
proposed amendment, it is reasonable to assume that history 
will repeat itself, with traders being interested only in areas 
where consumers can pay, that is, in cities, or areas within cities 
where poor consumers are at a minimum. This would mean that 
DISCOMs once again would be left with the poorest segment of 
consumers to serve, with no cross-subsidising consumers to be 
able to distribute the burden, or the ability to avail the option 
of cross-subsidies itself.
The changes that have been carried out so far in the sector 
have already been one of the main reasons for the current 
 fi nancial crises of the DISCOMs. In many states, the regional 
breakdown of distribution utilities have also weakened them 
fi nancially as they have been unable to depend on the economi-
cally advanced regions of the state to cover the losses from 
their economically backward counterparts. The new policy 
will only exacerbate the problem further.
Irrational ‘Rationalisation of Tariffs’
DISCOMs contend with large sections of consumers who 
cannot pay the full cost of electricity, such as small and 
middle peasants, poor urban and rural domestic consumers, and 
even to an extent some household-based or small enterprises. 
They usually depend on charging higher tariffs to consumers 
with the ability to pay, that is, large industrial and commer-
cial consumers, and use that revenue to cross-subsidise the 
poorer consumers.
However, the state’s ability to cross-subsidise has been cur-
tailed by the centre over the years. The Electricity Act of 2003 
itself mandated an “elimination of cross-subsidy,” which was 
later amended to a “progressive reduction in cross-subsidy.” 
What the New Electricity (Amendment) Bill, 2020 proposes is 
nothing less than a catastrophic game-changer, considering the 
ground realities in India. The amendments envisage that the 
SERCs will determine tariffs without allowing cross- subsidies 
which means, each category of consumer will pay what it costs 
to serve that category. State governments wishing to subsidise 
particular categories of consumers should do so through direct 
transfer of the subsidy amount into the benefi ciary accounts 
through the DBT (direct benefi t transfer) mechanism. 
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These proposals are acutely problematic. The most glaring 
impact of this would be to charge the steepest tariffs for rural 
consumers, for whom electricity supply entails long transmis-
sion and distribution lines, attendant line-losses and cost of 
various step-down transformers. Industrial consumers using 
high tension and extra high tension lines will have much lower 
costs to serve and hence their tariffs will be cheaper. This 
would be patently inequitable since electricity is not a luxury 
that rural consumers can do without, but a basic human neces-
sity, and hence they would have to be supplied at affordable 
prices regardless of the costs to serve them.
Expecting the states to directly subsidise them is virtually 
asking for the impossible, considering the precarious state of 
state fi nances. On the one hand, with the implementation of 
the goods and services tax (GST), revenue streams of states 
have been squeezed and states are increasingly dependent on 
the centre for money which often does not get released on 
time (ET Bureau 2020). On the other hand, poor consumers—
residential, agricultural, other categories of consumers (even 
amenity providers like public health centres and government 
schools)—form a signifi cant proportion of electricity users in 
most states and cannot afford to pay high costs for electricity. 
To expect the state governments to foot both the subsidy and 
cross-subsidies directly and immediately is infeasible and 
 impractical, to say the least. 
The inability to provide this basic necessity to households is 
likely to cost state-level representatives heavily. The central 
government while being responsible for the problem will 
however bear no responsibility for the consequences. 
Besides, the DBT scheme is also not proven to be successful 
across sectors. Its administration in a data-scarce environment 
is diffi cult, and effective and timely delivery of benefi ts is a 
problem. In the case of the electricity sector, the transfers will be 
done by cash-strapped state governments and it is reasonable 
to assume that this will not happen on time, if at all. So the 
DISCOMs (and defi nitely the private sub-licensees) will either cut 
off the power supply to consumers who cannot pay on time or if 
they cannot do so for political reasons, the problem of under-
recovery will not be solved in any case. If state DISCOMs cannot 
ensure the timely disbursal of subsidies from the state, how will 
individual consumers ensure the same? If tariff hikes can lead to 
protests in relatively higher income pockets of Mumbai, why will 
the same not play out across the country? Additional problems 
of households that live in rented premises where meters may 
be in someone else’s name further compound the problem. 
The old anti-subsidy ideological refrain in a new form is once 
again only likely to worsen the situation in the power sector.
State–Centre Relationship in the Power Sector
Another major concern about this new bill is that it seeks to 
centralise control over the power sector more aggressively 
than ever attempted before. This has been happening in creeping 
doses over the years through central policies binding on states, 
but the slew of amendments proposed in the bill indicates the 
encroachment of the centre into the states’ domain, in contra-
vention of the provisions of the Constitution. 
First, the bill seeks to wrest the power of appointment of the 
chairperson and members of the SERCs from the state govern-
ments to vest it in a central selection committee controlled by 
the central government. The bill proposes that the selection 
committee—common for the CERC, Appellate Tribunal for 
Electricity (APTEL) and the proposed Contract Enforcement 
Authority—will be headed by a chairperson, a judge, to be 
nominated by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, two serv-
ing secretaries to the Government of India (GoI), one of whom 
would also be the convener of the  selection committee and 
two chief secretaries of state governments to be appointed 
in the alphabetical order of states (that is, Andhra Pradesh, 
Arunachal Pradesh will go fi rst and so on), both for one year 
each. There are many problems with this arrangement. There 
is a confl ict of interest in having the same committee select the 
chairpersons and members of all regulatory bodies in the power 
sector. Also, to those familiar with the  Indian bureaucratic 
hierarchy, it is clear who will call the shots when there is a tie 
between two serving secretaries to the Goi and two chief 
secretaries of states, the latter being junior to the former two. 
Thus, virtually the centre controls the selection of state regulators 
and could control regulatory decisions at the state level, seriously 
jeopardising regulatory independence. Regulatory literature is 
legion on the need for a robust and impartial selection process 
for the independence of regulatory institutions.
Second, the bill categorically fi xes a time frame for state 
regulators to approve a tariff petition. If the SERC fails to fi x 
tariffs within 60 days of receiving a tariff revision petition, the 
revision sought in the petition would be deemed to have been 
approved. Setting unrealistic time limits for the state commis-
sions to fi x tariffs, considering the tortuous process involved in 
the collation of documents and verifi cation of fi nancial claims 
by the utilities and following due procedures, including public 
consultation, is a draconian proposal which hits at the root of 
regulatory remit at the state level.
Third, the proposed amendments empower the regional 
load dispatch centres (regional LDC) to withhold dispatch of 
power to states unless payment for power is made in advance 
by the DISCOMs. This means that the national LDC which will 
have powers to direct state LDCs could deny scheduling power if 
the DISCOMs fail to put up payment security. This is clearly in the 
interest of private sector RE developers who can now arm-twist 
the DISCOMs which are already caught in the cleft between 
“must-run” renewables and idling costs of backed down thermal 
power. It is a catch-22 situation for the DISCOMs that face pen-
alties if they do not offtake renewable power offered by the 
must-run generators and face fi nancial ruin if they do.
Fourth, the power of the state commissions to adjudicate 
upon disputes pertaining to contracts is proposed to be taken 
away and vested in a new regulatory authority called the Elec-
tricity Contract Enforcement Authority, whose members and 
the chairperson will be selected by the same selection commi-
ttee referred to above. Perhaps this move has been prompted 
by concerns expressed by the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh 
Y S Jaganmohan Reddy who contemplated reopening high-
cost solar PPAs or by the Supreme Court order of 2017 which 
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Economic & Political Weekly EPW  october 10, 2020 vol lV no 41 45
dismissed CERC’s order awarding compensatory tariff to two 
IPPs when their coal procurement costs went up consequent to 
a foreign government decision. Whatever the trigger, this 
binds the state governments even tighter into a debt spiral not 
all of which is their own making.
It is ironical that the central government that has saddled 
the states with PPAs incorporating infructuous idling charges 
for thermal plants not dispatched due to lower than estimated 
demand (by CEA, a central agency) and expensive renewable 
contracts fortifi ed with must-run diktat, should now set up a 
well-armed regulator under its control to ensure that these 
 iniquitous contracts are enforced with strict penalties that 
would further cripple the already ailing state governments.
Conclusions
The last 20 years have exposed the ineffi ciency of the central 
government in electricity planning, power sector fi nancing, 
national tariff policy, and in developing an equitable national 
RE policy. The proposed amendments are nothing but a des-
perate attempt by the government to cover up the policy mis-
calculations of the past decades while simultaneously protec-
ting the interests of power generators, both thermal and 
 renewable, at the cost of state distribution companies. The 
centralisation of powers envisaged in the proposed bill is 
 intended to penalise the state-owned DISCOMs for the faults of 
the central government and its agencies. The entire burden of 
the unrealistically ambitious renewable targets set ostensibly 
to please the international community is sought to be passed 
on to the states with the new regulatory authority wielding the 
stick to discipline them. 
Therefore, the proposed amendments in the New Electricity 
(Amendment) Bill, 2020 are not only thoroughly anti-people, 
but they will also do nothing to stem the crises in the sector and 
will only accelerate its deterioration. In the era of climate change, 
energy transitions, and rapid economic changes, what is required 
is good integration between the production, transmission, and 
distribution segments of the sector. The need for robust plan-
ning at all levels of government and signifi cant state interven-
tion to ensure the expansion of access to affordable and relia-
ble electricity to all segments of consumers cannot be empha-
sised enough. This cannot be done without the strong presence 
of the state government and other relevant state entities.
Given that the power sector and the economy as a whole 
face an immediate crisis in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and 
a long-term crisis because of unresolved issues, the government 
must hold off on passing any legislation hastily, especially when 
the states are busy fi ghting a more urgent battle against COVID-19. 
As we emerge from the more immediate crisis, wider consulta-
tion, and a more scientifi c and less ideological appro ach to 
deal with the travails of the power sector is urgently needed.
Notes
1  The proposed amendment to the Electricity 
Act, 2003 (draft circulated for discussion) can 
be downloaded at https://powermin.nic.in/sites/
default/fi les/webform/notices/Draft_Electrici-
ty_Amendment_Bill_2020_for_comments.pdf. 
2  Forty percent of Tamil Nadu’s solar capacity 
was commissioned before 2015 and has a cost 
of 7.01/kWh. Only 30% of its capacity is rela-
tively newer and has an average cost of 
3.5/kWh. This data has been extracted from 
the Tariff Order for Solar Plants in Tamil Nadu. 
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